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Abstract 
Legal systems often require the translation of qualitative assessments into quantitative 
judgments, yet the qualitative-to-quantitative conversion is a challenging, understudied process.  
We conducted an experimental test of predictions from a new theory of juror damage award 
decision making, examining how 154 lay people engaged in the translation process in 
recommending money damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury tort case.  The 
experiment varied the presence, size, and meaningfulness of an anchor number to determine how 
these factors influenced monetary award judgments, perceived difficulty, and subjective 
meaningfulness of awards.  As predicted, variability in awards was high, with awards 
participants considered to be “medium” (rather than “low” or “high”) having the most dispersion.  
The gist of awards as low, medium, or high fully mediated the relationship between perceived 
pain/suffering and award amount.  Moreover, controlling for participants’ perceptions of 
plaintiffs and defendants, as well as their desire to punish and to take economic losses into 
account, meaningful anchors predicted unique variance in award judgments:  A meaningful large 
anchor number drove awards up and a meaningful small anchor drove them down, whereas 
meaningless large and small anchors did not differ significantly.  Numeracy did not predict 
award magnitudes or variability, but surprisingly, more numerate participants reported that it was 
more difficult to pick an exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering.  The 
results support predictions of the theory about qualitative gist and meaningful anchors, and 
suggest that we can assist jurors to arrive at damage awards by providing meaningful numbers.   
Keywords: jury decisions; damage awards; fuzzy-trace theory; numeracy; anchoring 
effects 
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Public significance statement: Damage awards should reflect the underlying injury 
suffered by the plaintiff in civil cases, yet jurors find it challenging to decide on damage awards 
for an individual’s pain and suffering. Controlling for case factors, this experiment shows that 
providing meaningful anchor numbers helps mock jurors choose damage amounts that 
correspond to their underlying sense – the gist – of an individual’s pain and suffering.  
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From Meaning to Money: Translating Injury into Dollars 
 
The conversion of qualitative to quantitative judgments is central to many legal decisions, 
including damage awards (Hans, Rachlinski, & Owens, 2011).  A substantial amount of research 
documents the specific challenges people face in generating sound, reliable quantitative 
judgments (Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Nieder, 2016; Peters, 2012; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & 
Dieckmann, 2009).  That poses a special problem for the U.S. civil justice system, in which 
damage awards constitute a major remedy for civil wrongs.  Despite the importance of better 
understanding the qualitative to quantitative translation process in the law, it is undertheorized 
and understudied.  In particular, the role of meaning in numerical judgments is poorly 
understood.  The current article breaks new ground by analyzing factors leading to difficulty in 
deciding on appropriate damages and testing predictions about the meaning of numerical 
information from a model of damage award decision making. 
Jury Damage Awards 
 Jury damage awards are an important legal and policy matter in the U.S. Representative 
civil juries have the potential to provide an important contribution to civil justice.  Combining 
jurors’ diverse perspectives on the value of an injury can keep civil awards in line with the 
community’s shifting assessments of appropriate compensation (Hans, 2014).  Although the U.S. 
public is generally supportive of the jury system, some observers of the civil justice system 
pinpoint damage awards as an area of concern.  Insurance agents, lawyers, and their clients 
worry about their ability to predict jury awards, which makes it difficult for them to assess in 
advance whether to settle or to take a case to trial (Daniels & Martin, 2015; Goodman-Delahunty 
et al., 2010; Hans, 2000; Hans & Eisenberg, 2011; Jacobson et al., 2011).  
Juries (and judges as well) face an unusually ambiguous situation in determining money 
FROM MEANING TO MONEY   5 
damages.  The intangibility of many losses such as the pain of a severe injury or the death of a 
family member, uncertainty of future projections about the lifelong effects of an injury, and 
limited guidance all contribute to ambiguity (Diamond, Rose, Murphy, & Meixner, 2011; 
Sherwin, Eisenberg, & Re, 2012). An additional complication is that dollar awards are an 
unbounded scale, which contributes to variability (Hastie, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1998).  
 Analysis of jury damage awards provides a mixed picture. Reassuringly, more serious 
injuries typically receive greater compensation (Greene & Bornstein, 2003; Wissler et al., 1997; 
Wissler, Rector, & Saks, 2001).  Yet jurors face substantial problems in coming up with damage 
award figures (Diamond et al., 2011; Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Mott, Hans, & 
Simpson, 2000).  Sunstein et al. (2002) and Wissler et al. (1999) have found that people tend to 
show greater consensus in their qualitative assessements, such as evaluating the wrongfulness of 
a defendant’s behavior or the severity of a plaintiff’s injury, than in their dollar awards.    
Economic damages often have straightforward referents such as lost income or medical 
expenses, a fact that may reduce difficulty and reliance on irrelevant factors in determining 
economic damages (e.g., Girvan & Marek, 2016). In contrast, pain and suffering and punitive 
damages do not typically have clear referents. The jury is well-suited to play an especially 
crucial role in judgments about intangible damages such as pain and suffering precisely because 
there are no clear referents. Combining the valuations of diverse members of the community, the 
jury award provides an approximation of the community’s assessment of the value (Hans, 2014). 
 In sum, jurors deciding damage awards, and particularly awards for pain and suffering, 
encounter limited legal guidance, intangible injuries, uncertain projections, an unbounded scale 
for dollar awards, and low numeracy.  Relatively little research has addressed the translation of 
injury severity to specific dollar awards.  How individuals employ dollar scales to reflect their 
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qualitative judgments is thought to be “possibly meaningless” rather than a systematic process to 
be studied (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1998, p. 67).   
A New Model of Jury Damage Award Decision Making 
With the aim of moving research and theory in this area forward, Hans and Reyna 
proposed (2011) and tested (Reyna, Hans, Corbin, Yeh, Lin, & Royer, 2015) a new model of 
damage award decision making.  The goal of the model is to identify the process by which jurors 
move from the qualitative to the quantitative, from a judgment about injury to a decision about a 
dollar award. The current experiment tests predictions from the Hans-Reyna gist model.   
The Hans-Reyna model draws on fuzzy-trace theory (FTT; Reyna, 2012a, b; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 2011). According to FTT, people encode two types of mental representations of 
information in parallel: verbatim and gist representations (e.g., Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & 
Brainerd, 2016; Singer & Remillard, 2008). Verbatim representations are literal and detailed.  In 
contrast, gist representations are the meaning a person derives from the information. Verbatim 
representations preserve the specific surface form of information, such as exact wording and 
precise numbers, compared to the bottom-line general meaning captured in gist representations.  
People engage in both gist and verbatim forms of thinking, but when they make judgments, gist 
tends to be more important (Hans & Reyna, 2011).   
The Hans-Reyna model posits that jurors make both categorical (damages are warranted 
or not) and ordinal (the damages deserved are low or high) gist determinations, and search for 
dollar award amounts that fit the gist judgments (Hans & Reyna, 2011). Throughout the trial, the 
model assumes that jurors engage in mainly gist-based reasoning about the plaintiff’s injury and 
the defendant’s culpability to determine liability. The juror reaches a categorical (yes or no) 
judgment about whether damages are warranted.  Jurors encode the subjective impression of the 
FROM MEANING TO MONEY   7 
specific injury the plaintiff has suffered in terms of severity.  In line with that ordinal gist of 
injury severity, they determine whether the damage award that is deserved is low or high.  
Intuitions about ordinal distinctions between low and high (but typically not specific numbers) 
are available in memory.  If an award is judged as warranted, but it is neither low nor high, then 
the gist is less clear and it falls into a more nebulous hedging category of medium.  
The ordinal gist judgment about the deserved damages (low, medium, or high) is mapped 
onto a number that corresponds to the gist of the award judgment.  The juror will identify a 
number that is, to him or her, low, medium, or high, to match the deserved damages.  Jurors are 
apt to rely on symbolic numbers from everyday life that already have meaning to them as low or 
high numbers.  To most of us, one dollar is low; a million dollars is high.  An individual’s 
background will also shape his or her interpretation of low and high numbers. Jurors also obtain 
numbers from the case, including medical costs, lost wages, and attorney ad damnum requests, 
numbers that the attorneys have convincingly portrayed as having a meaningful interpretation in 
the context of the case (Hastie, 2011).  The juror draws on these sources to generate an award 
amount that matches the ordinal (low, medium, high) gist of the deserved damages. The 
description of the process is presented as occurring in serial stages, but the model anticipates 
interactivity across these judgments. Thus, the decision making process is not linear.  For 
example, judgments of the severity of an injury may influence attributions of responsibility 
(Robbennolt & Hans, 2016).  
The model anticipates that psychological factors could affect damage award decision 
making. For example, cognitive style variables such as need for cognition (NC) and cognitive 
reflection, which figure promienntly in contemporary theories of judgment and decision making 
(Frederick, 2005; Stanovich & West, 2008) and have been found in prior research to influence 
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juror decisions (Bornstein, 2004; McAuliff & Kovera, 2008), may also affect damage award 
decisions. Earlier research has explored the role of NC in judgments of expert testimony.  For 
example, Bornstein (2004) found that mock jurors who were low in NC were more responsive to 
anecdotal expert evidence; mock jurors high in NC did not favor anecdotal over experimental 
evidence.  McAuliff and Kovera (2008) found that participants high in NC were sensitive to 
variations in the quality of expert evidence, but those low in NC were not.  The high NC mock 
jurors were more likely to find for the plaintiff when her expert presented a valid study than an 
invalid study; low NC mock jurors were not influenced by the validity of the expert’s study.   
A fact finder’s numeracy has been predicted to facilitate better and more consistent 
decision making involving numbers (Helm, Hans, & Reyna, 2017). Although numeracy itself has 
been extensively researched (for a review, see Reyna et al., 2009), its relationship to award 
decision making has received little attention (Rowell & Bregant, 2014; but see Bornstein, 2004, 
Experiment 2). In making decisions, people lower in numeracy are more likely to rely on 
irrelevant cues in lieu of using relevant numerical information (Peters et al., 2007; Reyna, 
Nelson, Han, & Pignone, 2015). The lack of “number sense” (Geary et al., 2011; Siegler & 
Booth, 2004) could lead to difficulty in producing a reliable gist of low or high dollar amounts.  
Literal numbers are not translated one-for-one into gist representations—they are interpreted in 
context as low or high.  A gist model emphasizes the need to distinguish between number sense--
the ability to meaningfully interpret numbers--and the ability to engage in numerical calculations 
(Liberali et al., 2012). That is important, because research has shown that people higher in 
computational numeracy may rate numerically inferior monetary gambles as more attractive than 
superior gambles (Reyna et al., 2009).  The current experiment offers a new opportunity to 
explore how facility with numbers influences award judgments. 
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Measures of subjective numeracy assess self-perceptions of the ability to use numbers 
and generally correlate with performance-based objective numeracy measures (Fagerlin et al., 
2007).  However, like many self-perceptions of ability, they are likely to be subject to the 
Dunning-Kruger effect in which those with low ability overestimate their competence (Dunning, 
Heath, & Suls, 2004).  Thus, subjective numeracy may be related to confidence and perceived 
difficulty of numerical judgments. 
Previous Efforts to Test the Gist Model 
Hans and Reyna (2011) examined whether predictions from the gist model were 
consistent with existing research findings about jury damage awards.  Predictions derived from 
the model were that jurors search for meaningful numbers to reflect their gist of the cases; that 
damage awards overrepresent round numbers since round numbers are easier to map onto gist 
judgments; that there is ordinal regularity in damage award judgments; and that, because gist 
judgments are fuzzy, anchor figures provide context for jurors (allowing them to translate “low” 
and “high” into dollars) and thus influence damage awards.  All four of these general predictions 
were borne out.   
Following up, Reyna, Hans, et al. (2015) tested specific predictions from the Hans-Reyna 
model.   Participants read a scenario of a personal injury motor vehicle accident trial and were 
asked to give a specific dollar award for pain and suffering. A statement made by the 
hypothetical foreman varied three dimensions of an anchor number: the amount of the anchor, 
the meaningfulness of the anchor, and the relative perception of the anchor number.  In the 
meaningful anchor conditions, the foreman offered a meaningful number that could be used to 
judge the gist of damages (e.g., the national median annual income).  In contrast, in the 
meaningless anchor conditions, the foreman mentioned the same number but in an irrelevant 
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context (the cost of courtroom renovations).  A relative perception manipulation aimed to shift 
the interpretation of the gist of the number as comparatively low or high.  For example, the 
foreman observed, “To begin the conversation, I was thinking $40,000 would be a good award 
because that is way above the national median annual income.”  
Research on anchoring (for summaries see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; 
Kahneman, 2011) has been conducted almost exclusively with meaningless anchors.  Reyna, 
Hans, et al. (2015) expected that even a meaningless anchor would provide some amount of 
context and would influence award decisions because people were more likely to have fuzzy 
gists in mind rather than concrete numbers.  However, they hypothesized that the meaningful 
anchor number would be more influential than the meaningless anchor.  A meaningful anchor 
could help jurors by providing information about the magnitude of relevant numbers; it might 
also resonate with case facts. The gist-based model predicts that jurors will anchor onto 
meaningful numbers that match their own gist of the case and use these numbers to generate a 
damage award amount.  Jurors should anchor more strongly to meaningful anchors, hence those 
awards should be less variable than awards in meaningless anchor conditions.  As for the relative 
perception manipulation, the foreman’s suggestion that a specific anchor is a relatively small 
amount of money should provide context for what a low amount means, leading participants to 
award higher amounts of money, compared to participants who are told that the anchor amount is 
a great deal of money.  It should be noted that all of the anchors were manipulated as relative 
comparisons; meaningful small versus large anchors were not directly investigated.   
 The size, meaningfulness, and perception manipulations influenced the awards in ways 
consistent with gist theory.  The anchor size, anchor meaning, and relative perception interacted.  
Meaningful large and small anchors differed significantly whether or not the relative perception 
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of the anchor numbers varied.  The relative perception manipulation was meant to drive awards 
either upwards or downwards by making the anchor appear to be a small or a large number.  It 
was effective too, but only in conditions with meaningless anchors.  When a meaningful anchor 
was present, it drove the damage award.  When it was absent, the contextual cue provided 
through the relative perception measure drove the damage award.  The results supported another 
prediction, that jury awards would be more variable in the meaningless anchor condition, 
because in the meaningful anchor condition participants’ awards would center more tightly 
around the relevant anchor. Meaningful anchors led to damage awards of lower variability 
compared to awards in the meaningless anchor conditions and to a no anchor control condition.   
Current Experiment: Refining and Expanding Measures and Testing Predictions 
The current experiment builds upon this base developed by Hans, Reyna, and their 
colleagues to test the model by (a) directly manipulating small versus large anchors that vary in 
meaningfulness without relative comparisons, (b) explicitly measuring perceived meaningfulness 
of anchors, (c) examining the “fuzziness” or malleability of award judgments, (d) extending the 
model to consider theoretically important individual differences (e.g., in numeracy, cognitive 
reflection, and need for cognition) and (e) analyzing factors that affect perceived difficulty of 
making pain and suffering award judgments. The experiment manipulates the presence, size, and 
meaningfulness of an anchor number provided in a mock juror scenario study. It uses a different 
approach to the anchor manipulation, poses questions that directly test aspects of the Hans-Reyna 
model including perceived meaningfulness, and examines the impact of numeracy and cognitive 
style. In addition to effects on award judgments, we examine effects of these factors on rated 
difficulty of and confidence in awards. Ultimately, we are able to model award judgments 
controlling for perceptions of case factors, such as perceptions of plaintiffs and defendants, along 
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with individual differences in the ability and desire to process numbers, isolating unique variance 
associated with manipulating the meaningfulness of numerical anchors. 
Hypotheses 1-3: Meaningfulness and size of anchor numbers  
 The first three hypotheses tested in the experiment relate to the meaningfulness and size 
of the anchor numbers. We predicted that (1) income measures (meaningful anchors) would be 
perceived as more meaningful than the courtroom renovations measure (meaningless anchor); 
that (2) numerical anchors, in addition to perceptions of the case and individual differences, 
would shift damage awards in the direction of the anchors; and that (3) the amount and the 
meaningfulness of the anchor would interact. Meaningful large anchors were predicted to drive 
awards up, compared to meaningless anchors; in contrast, meaningful small anchors were 
predicted to drive awards down, compared to meaningless anchors. 
 The current experiment examines anchor meaning in more detail and measures the 
participants’ subjective evaluations of meaning. This experiment investigates the direct effect of 
meaningful versus meaningless anchors on award amounts, as opposed to effects of relative 
comparisons to anchors, as was done in the previous study on meaningful anchors (Reyna, Hans, 
et al., 2015).  As described above, the Reyna, Hans, et al.  (2015) study incorporated the anchor 
manipulations into the foreman’s remarks, varying whether the dollar figure the foreman 
mentioned was an income measure or the cost of courtroom construction.  When it came to pain 
and suffering, average income was assumed to be more meaningful to participants than 
construction costs of a courtroom because the former provides a benchmark for judging whether 
the magnitude of an award is small or large.  However, the perceived subjective meaningfulness 
of an anchor is important to study directly, and the current experiment does so.   
Hypotheses 4 amd 5: Ordinality and variability of awards 
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The model also led to the predictions that (4) gist is roughly ordinally coherent; awards 
perceived as low versus high would differ in magnitude in the appropriate direction; and that (5) 
jurors who give an award that they consider to be a “medium” amount would show the most 
variability in award judgments, while those who give an award that they consider to be “low” or 
“high” would show less variability in award judgments. The Hans-Reyna theory assumes that 
participants make ordinal judgments about the appropriate award as low, medium or high, and 
then select numbers that fit the ordinal gist.  To test these hypotheses about ordinality and 
variability of awards, the current experiment asks specifically whether the award amounts that 
participants have given are, in their view, nothing (nil), low, medium, or high.  We then compare 
the low, medium, and high awards and examine their central tendencies and their dispersion.   
Hypotheses relating to role of individual difference variables in award decisions 
The experiments permit a test of the effects on damage award decision making of 
individual-difference variables found in prior research to be important in juror decisions and in 
numerical judgments, including objective numeracy, subjective numeracy, and aspects of 
cognitive style. The experiment extends mock jury research on need for cognition (NC) by 
examining whether NC is associated with damage award judgments.  We predicted that both (6) 
cognitive style and (7) numeracy would affect damage award decisions. Higher numeracy and 
NC are usually expected to reduce susceptibility to anchoring and other biases (see Reyna et al., 
2009).  However, if measures capture sensitivity to the gist of numbers, then more numerate and 
high NC jurors would be predicted to be more responsive to the relevant cue of meaningful 
anchorsin arriving at damage awards, compared to jurors low in numeracy and in NC.  
Hypotheses relating to predictors of difficulty in arriving at a damage award 
 The experiment permits us to examine the perceived difficulty in arriving at a damage 
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award amount and confidence in the decision.  Participants are asked how difficult it was for 
them to determine an appropriate award in the case, and how confident they are in that judgment. 
We predict that (8) anchors, especially meaningful anchors, (9) cognitive style, and (10) 
numeracy will decrease the perceived difficulty of making an award and increase confidence in 
award judgments. In sum, the current experiment has the potential to make theoretical progress 
by testing elements of the Hans-Reyna damage award model, and examining the role of 
numeracy and cognitive style in damage award judgments.   
Method   
Participants 
 A total of 154 undergraduate students (77% female; MAge = 20.01, SD =1.67) took part in 
the experiment. Participants received course credit in Psychology or Human Development 
courses at a northeastern university.  It was a racially diverse group: 70% of participants 
identified themselves as White, 18% as Asian, 3% as mixed ethnicity, 7% as African American 
and 2% selected other.  Furthermore, 5% of the participants identified themselves as having 
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin.  All participants indicated that they were 18 years of age or 
older and could communicate effectively in English.  Our prior work with this population 
(Reyna, Hans, et al., 2015) showed that the majority fulfilled key requirements for jury service 
in New York (i.e., at least 18 years of age, reside in the area, U.S. citizens, and facility with 
English). An absence of felony convictions is also a jury service requirement, but we did not ask 
about participants’ criminal history.  
Procedure 
Cornell University’s Institutional Review Board for Human Participants reviewed and 
approved the study procedure and all materials as qualifying for an exemption from full IRB 
FROM MEANING TO MONEY   15 
review. The experiment was a 2 (anchor amount: large anchor, small anchor) X 2 (anchor 
meaning: anchor is meaningful, anchor is meaningless) between-subjects experiment with an 
additional no anchor control group. The experiment was conducted online through Qualtrics. 
After agreeing to participate, the participants were randomly assigned to one of the five 
experimental conditions. They read a 1,272 word case scenario, decided on a damage award, and 
answered questions about the case. Participants answered more general questions tapping 
psychological tendencies and provided their demographic characteristics.    
Materials 
The study materials began with a set of instructions about informed consent and what to 
expect in the study.  It then proceeded to present a trial summary in the case of Monroe v.  
Rumson, a negligence case involving a personal injury based on the actual case of Abbinante v. 
O’Connell (1996) and employed in previous research projects on damage awards (McAuliff & 
Bornstein, 2010; Reyna, Hans, et al., 2015).  Reflecting the usual sequence of events at trial, the 
summary presented the case facts and then short judicial instructions.  The summary specified 
that the defendant had been found liable for the plaintiff’s injuries and that economic damages 
had already been paid to the plaintiff.  The judge explained that their task was to arrive at a 
dollar figure to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering.  The judge also explained that 
there are no definite mathematical formulas or instructions for determining pain and suffering 
awards.  The instructions directed jurors to use their best judgment in coming up with an award 
amount.  They were instructed that “punitive damages intended to punish the defendant should 
not be taken into account when determining the plaintiff’s award.”  
 The anchor manipulation was included in the first question that participants answered, 
which varied whether the anchor was large or small and meaningful or meaningless. Participants 
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in the large anchor conditions saw $1.5 million as their anchor.  This was described as either the 
median lifetime income (large meaningful condition) or the cost of courtroom renovations (large 
meaningless condition).  Participants in the small anchor conditions saw $50,000 as their anchor.  
This was described as either the median annual income (small meaningful condition) or the cost 
of courtroom renovations (small meaningless condition).  For example, in the meaningless large 
anchor condition, the question read as follows: “The courtroom is under construction, and this 
project will cost about $1.5 million. Do you think the award amount to the plaintiff Rebecca 
Munroe for her pain and suffering should be above or below this number?” Two options (above; 
below) were given. (Just 11% of participants in the large anchor conditions thought the award 
should be above $1.5 million, compared to 42% in the small anchor conditions who thought the 
award should exceed $50,000.) In the no anchor condition, the question was omitted.  
Anchor numbers were selected based on previous research and the plausibility of the 
numbers as estimates of median annual income and median lifetime income.  The control group 
participants in Reyna, Hans, et al. (2015) reading the same case awarded an average of $224,288, 
an amount which fell between the two anchor numbers. The U. S. Census Bureau estimated 
annual median household income rose to $55,775 in 2015 (U. S. Census Bureau, 2016).  
Multiplying the annual median income figure that we used ($50,000) by 30 years of such income 
produces the large anchor amount of $1.5 million. 
After being asked for their award amount, participants were asked to state whether they 
considered their award amount to be nil (basically nothing), low, medium, or high, to state their 
highest acceptable award, to state their lowest acceptable award, to provide confidence 
judgments, and to describe the reasons for the award amount.  Confidence judgments were 
evaluated on 1 (not at all confident) to 10 (completely confident) scales.  (We retained scale 
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values for judgments used in prior work.)  Participants were then asked whether they agreed that 
the median annual income, median lifetime income, and cost of courtroom renovations were 
meaningful when determining the damage award.  They answered each of these questions on a 
scale from 1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
 The participants rated the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and the severity of the 
plaintiff’s pain and suffering on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = low, 7 = high).  The participants also 
rated their perceptions of the plaintiff and of the defendant on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = extremely 
negative, 7 = extremely positive).  In addition, participants rated the extent to which the 
defendant was negligent and the extent to which the defendant contributed to the plaintiff’s 
injuries, making both ratings on a scale from 1 to 11 (1 = not at all, 11 = extremely).  
Participants were further asked to estimate how difficult it was to decide on an award, how 
motivated they were while reading the case, and how much cognitive effort they exerted.  These 
estimates were made on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = very little, 7 = great amount).  Participants were 
asked if their award decision was affected by their desire to punish the defendant, on a scale 
from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal).  Subjects were also asked if they took economic 
damages (medical bills, lost wages, etc.) into account, and if so, the extent to which that 
influenced their decision, on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = not at all, 7 = a great deal). The questions 
and scale values were consistent with those used in prior research (Reyna, Hans, et al., 2015). 
 Participants were given tasks which measure numeracy and thinking styles.  Specifically, 
participants completed the 15-item expanded numeracy scale, which is composed of the 3-item 
general numeracy scale (with minor variations) created by Schwartz, Woloshin, Black and 
Welch (1997), an additional 8 items proposed by Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001), and four 
items added by Peters et al. (2007), which test familiarity with simple arithmetical operations 
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(e.g. multiplication), basic probability and related ratio concepts (e.g., fractions, decimals, 
proportions, percentages, and probability), and ability to keep track of class-inclusion relations 
(Liberali et al., 2012; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008).  They also completed the 8-item subjective 
numeracy scale (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, & Smith, 2007), which 
assesses individuals’ beliefs about their mathematical skills and preferences for numerical 
information, and the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005), which tests the ability to inhibit 
intuitive responses in favor of deliberative responses to mathematical problems.  Finally, 
participants completed the 18-item need-for-cognition scale (Caccioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), 
which measures how much individuals enjoy engaging in effortful thinking.  Questions tapping 
austistic tendencies were included, but are not analyzed in the current article. 
Results 
Income Measures Were Perceived As More Meaningful than Renovations 
 We expected that income measures (our meaningful anchor conditions) would be 
perceived as more meaningful than the courtroom renovations measure (our meaningless anchor 
condition). This prediction was supported by our results.  
Regardless of which anchor was presented to the participant as a manipulation, we asked 
all participants to rate the meaningfulness of the three different types of anchors – courtroom 
renovations, median lifetime income, and median annual income, on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree that it is meaningful) to 7 (strongly agree that it is meaningful).  A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with meaningfulness rating as the dependent variable and anchor type (courtroom 
renovations, median lifetime income, median annual income) as a within-subjects factor revealed 
a main effect of anchor type (F(2, 152) = 96.21, p < .001, ηp2 =.56).  Participants found the 
median annual income significantly more meaningful than either the median lifetime income 
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(t(153) = 4.57,  p < .001, d = 0.33, 95% CI [0.15,  0.51]) or the cost of courtroom renovations 
(t(153) = 13.83, p < .001, d = 1.43, 95% CI [1.25, 1.61]) (Mannual income = 4.52, SD = 1.56; Mlifetime 
income = 3.99, SD = 1.67; Mcourtroom renovations = 2.25, SD = 1.63). The median lifetime income was 
rated higher than the meaningless courtroom renovations anchor (t(153) = 11.23, p < .001, d = 
1.06, 95% CI [0.88, 1.24]).  Both income anchors means are close to the midpoint of the scale, 
suggesting that they were not considered to be strongly meaningful.  
 In order to check that participants who received our meaningful anchor found the anchor 
they saw more meaningful than those who saw our meaningless anchor, we also conducted an 
ANOVA with “meaningfulness of anchor seen” as the dependent variable.  This variable was the 
meaningfulness rating each participant gave to the anchor that he or she had seen, with higher 
numbers indicating greater meaningfulness.  For instance, for participants who saw an anchor 
that was described as the median lifetime income, the dependent measure was their rating of the 
meaningfulness of the median lifetime income anchor.  Manipulated anchor meaning 
(meaningful, meaningless) and the amount of anchor (high, low) were entered into the ANOVA 
as factors.   
 This analysis revealed a main effect, as expected, of anchor meaning.  Participants found  
the meaningful anchors (median lifetime income in the high condition and median annual income 
in the low condition) more meaningful than the meaningless anchors (courtroom renovations) 
(Mmeaningful = 3.97, SD = 1.58; Mmeaningless = 2.56, SD = 1.73; F(1, 117) = 22.25, p < .001, d = 0.85, 
95% CI [0.56, 1.14]).  There was no significant main effect of anchor amount (F(1, 117) = 1.97, 
p = .16, d = 0.26, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.58]) and no significant interaction between anchor meaning 
and anchor amount (F(1, 117) = .94, p = .56, ηp2 = .00).  In sum, both analytic approaches 
confirmed expectations that the meaningful anchors would be perceived as more meaningful than 
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the meaningless anchors.  
Numerical Anchors, and the Amount and Meaning of those Anchors, Influenced Damage 
Award Decisions 
 We predicted that numerical anchors, in addition to perceptions of the case and individual 
differences, would influence damage awards. We also predicted that the influence of anchor on 
damage award decisions would depend on the numerical amount of the anchor and the 
meaningfulness of the anchor. Meaningful large anchors should drive awards up, compared to 
meaningless anchors; in contrast, meaningful small anchors should drive awards down, 
compared to meaningless anchors. In order to test this prediction, we first conducted an initial 
ANOVA examining the effects of the manipulated factors (i.e., anchor amount and 
meaningfulness). We then examined mock jurors’ individual differences and perceptions of the 
case that we planned to control for. Finally, we examined the effect of our manipulations of 
anchor meaning and amount controlling for these individual differences and case perceptions.  
 Overall ANOVA examining mean differences. We first conducted an analysis of 
variance with award amount as the dependent measure, award type (lowest acceptable award, 
award amount, and highest acceptable award) as a within-subjects factor and anchor type (no 
anchor, meaningless small anchor, meaningless large anchor, meaningful small anchor, 
meaningful large anchor) as a between-subjects factor. This analysis revealed a main effect of 
award type, such that participants gave the lowest amount for their lowest acceptable award (M = 
$93,003.72, SE = $16,852.92), an intermediate amount for their actual award amount (M = 
$231,941.26, SE = $35,188.42), and the highest amount for their highest acceptable award (M = 
$528,067.13, SE  = $88,325.41) (F(2,145) = 20.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .22). All of these differences 
were large (lowest acceptable award – award amount t(152) = 5.89, p < .001, d = 0.40, 95% CI 
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[0.16,  0.64]; lowest acceptable award – highest acceptable award t(150) = 5.26, p < .001, d = 
0.54, 95% CI [0.31, 0.76]; award amount – highest acceptable award t(151) = 4.50, p < .001, d = 
0.34, 95% CI [0.12, 0.57]. Figure 1 displays the enormous variability in these acceptable awards.  
 Analyses also revealed a main effect of condition (F(4, 146) = 5.76, p < .001,  ηp2 =.14). 
Participants gave the least in the meaningful small (M = $103,722.28, SE = $96,809.07), 
meaningless small (M = $105,805.41, SE = $98,464.04), and no anchor conditions (M = 
$166,815.63, SE = $93,734.98). The meaningless large amount (M = $404,526.88, SE = 
$95,234.83) was significantly higher than the meaningless small amount (t(59) = 3.23, p = .03, d 
= .78, 95% CI [0.26, 1.30]) and the meaningful small amount (t(59) = 3.27, p = .03, d = 0.79, 
95% CI [0.26, 1.31]). The meaningful large amount (M = $640,816.67, SE = $98,464.04) was 
significantly higher than the no anchor amount (t(61) = 2.80, p = .001, d = .63, 95% CI [0.13, 
1.14]), the meaningful small amount (t(59) = 3.06, p < .001, d = 0.74, 95% CI [0.22, 1.26]), and 
the meaningless small amount (t(59) = 3.04, p < .001, d = .74, 95% CI [0.22 – 1.26]).  
We expected that the raw award mean for the meaningful large award condition would be 
greater than the meaningless large award mean (and that the meaningful small award condition 
would be lower than the meaningless small award).  Although the means were in the predicted 
direction, these amounts were not significantly different from each other (before controlling for 
other factors; see below) (Mmeaningfulsmall = $78,483.33, SD = $91,037.55; Mmeaninglesssmall = 
$80,117.33, SD = $105,675.27, t(58) = .06, p = .95, d = .02, 95% CI [-0.49, 0.52]; Mmeaningfullarge 
= $552,433.33, SD = $819.515.66; Mmeaninglesslarge = $350,566.67, SD = $429,392.81, t(120) = 
1.10, p = .24, d  = 0.31, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.82]). 
Finally, there was a significant two-way interaction between condition and award type 
(F(8, 292) = 2.86, p = .004, ηp2 = .07), displayed in Figure 1. (Note: Mauchly's Test of Sphericity 
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showed that the sphericity assumption was violated; correcting for the sphericity violation with 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction produced the same significant results.) As one can observe by 
inspecting Figure 1, and consistent with the significance tests, the three types of awards were 
more similar to each other in the control condition than in the anchor conditions.  In the no 
anchor condition, there were no differences among award types (although this result just missed 
statistical significance) (F(2, 30) = 3.25, p = .053, ηp2 = .18). In the small and large anchor 
conditions, award types differed significantly (Meaningless small F(2, 27) = 7.66, p = .002, ηp2 = 
.36, Meaningful small F(2, 28) = 8.46, p = .001, ηp2 = .38, Meaningless large F(2, 29) = 12.95, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .47, Meaningful large F(2, 27) = 5.13, p = .01, ηp2 = .28). 
 Understanding Individual Differences and Case Perceptions. The descriptive statistics 
for individual-difference measures and questions about the case are contained in Table 1.  In 
order to understand differences in how jurors perceived and processed the case, we ran a factor 
analysis (technically, a principal component analysis) using varimax rotation, with individual-
difference measures for each subject (objective numeracy, subjective numeracy, cognitive 
reflection test, and need for cognition) and with the subjects’ responses to questions that we 
asked them about the case (questions about the plaintiff, the defendant, difficulty picking a 
figure, role of punishment and economic losses in making an award judgment, and motivation 
and cognitive effort related to the task). A factor analysis using Promax (oblique) rotation was 
also performed, with similar results; we report the Varimax rotation results because the Varimax 
rotation isolates unique sources of variance. The results of our analysis using oblique rotation are 
reported in the the supplemental materials (Table 5 (S2)).   
 Five independent factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were extracted, accounting for 
59.41% of the variance.  Table 2 displays all factor loadings, bolding those above .4.  
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Interpretations of the factors were as follows:  Factor 1 represents numeracy and difficulty 
picking a figure; Factor 2 represents motivation and effort in determining the award; Factor 3 
represents perceptions of the plaintiff; Factor 4 represents perceptions of the defendant; and 
Factor 5 represents the extent to which punishment and economic loss were taken into account.   
 Influences on Damage Award Amounts. In order to test for the predicted interaction 
between anchor meaning and anchor amount while controlling for individual-difference and case 
perception factors, we ran a linear regression using our experimental manipulations (anchor 
amount [large, small] and anchor meaning [meaningful, meaningless]), the interaction between 
anchor amount and anchor meaning, and the case perception and individual-difference factors 
from our factor analysis to predict damage award amounts.   
Table 3 presents the results of this regression.  Four variables were statistically significant 
predictors of participants’ award amounts: the interaction between anchor amount and anchor 
meaning, the perception of the plaintiff; the perception of the defendant; and the extent to which 
punishment and economic loss were taken into account.  
The significant interaction between anchor amount and anchor meaning provided some 
support for our prediction that meaning would boost the impact of the anchor amount.  As Figure 
2 illustrates, the meaningful anchor significantly boosted the impact of the large anchor amount, 
relative to both small anchors.  As expected, differences in the meaningless condition were 
smaller. Indeed, in the meaningless anchor conditions, awards in the small and large anchor 
conditions did not differ significantly (and small anchors did not differ significantly).   
 As for the other significant predictor variables, perceptions of the plaintiff and the 
defendant influenced awards.  People who perceived the plaintiff more positively gave higher 
awards, and those who perceived the defendant more negatively gave higher awards.  The 
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participants’ ratings about the extent to which they took punishment and economic loss into 
account also influenced award judgments.  People who said they took punishment and economic 
loss into account gave higher awards. We also ran this regression controlling for the gender of 
participants. Significant and nonsignificant results remained the same and gender was not a 
significant predictor (B = -24110.59, SE = 104632.32, β = -.019, t(145) = -.23, p = .82).  
Therefore, we collapsed across gender in the analyses. 
To test the prediction that participants with high numeracy and NC would lead them to be 
more responsive than other participants to meaningful anchors, we added an interaction term 
between the Numeracy/difficulty factor and anchor meaning to an expanded regression. 
However, the interaction term was not significant (B = .07, t (145) = -.56, p = .58). 
 In response to a reviewer’s suggestion, we ran the regression analysis using the square 
root of the award amount (as opposed to the raw award amount) as the dependent variable, to 
control for a positive skew in our award amount data: skewness of 3.72 (SE = .22). This analysis 
produced very similar results, except that the interaction between anchor amount and anchor 
meaning missed significance (B =188.76, SE = 109.89, β = .24, t (145) = 1.72, p = .09) and the 
main effect of anchor amount (small/large) was significant (B =163.48, SE = 77.99, β = .24, t 
(145) = .2.10, p = .04).  
Serial Mediation Analysis Regarding Perception of the Severity of Pain and Suffering, Gist 
Judgments, and Award Amounts 
 Regression analysis was used to investigate the hypothesis that a participant’s 
categorization of his or her award amount as nil, low, medium, or high would mediate the 
relationship between perception of the severity of pain and suffering and award amount. When 
entered separately in linear regressions, the participant’s rated severity of pain and suffering was 
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a significant predictor of his or her award amount (B = 84634.62, SE = 735819.68, β = .21, t(152) 
= 2.36, p = .02), and the gist judgment of the award amount was also a significant predictor of the 
award amount (B = 234411.86, SE = 61088.33, β = .33, t(152) = 3.84, p = .001). Participants’ 
pain and suffering perceptions were also significant predictors of the gist judgment (B = .14, SE 
= .04, β = .27, t(152) = 3.45, p = .001).  
 We then ran a regression examining the effect of severity of pain and suffering rating on 
award amount controlling for the participant’s gist of the award amount as a mediator. In this 
regression, the severity of pain and suffering rating was no longer a significant predictor of 
award amount (B = 46085.26, SE = 33993.24, β = .12, t(151) = 1.36, p = .18). This suggests that 
the relationship between the participant’s pain and suffering severity rating and the award 
amount is fully mediated by the gist judgment of the award amount as nil, low, medium, or high. 
We used the Sobel Test (Sobel, 1982) to test whether gist of award amount significantly 
mediated the relationship between the pain and suffering rating and the award amount, and 
results indicated that it did (Sobel Test Statistic = 2.67, SE = 12,071.05, p = .008).  
 We also tested an alternative model in which the relationship between severity of pain 
and suffering and gist judgment of award was mediated by the participant’s award amount, as 
might happen if the participants engaged in post-hoc adjustments following the award judgment. 
In this model, the award amount was only a partial mediator of gist judgment. When predicting 
the gist judgment of award using both the pain and suffering severity rating and the award 
amount, both predictors were significant (B = 4.16, SE = <.001, β = .29, t (151)= 3.39, p = .001; 
and B = .10, SE = .05, β = .19, t(151) = 2.22, p = .03 respectively).  
Variability in Awards in the “Muddy Middle” 
We predicted that jurors who gave an award that they considered to be a “medium” 
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amount would show the most variability in award judgments, while those who gave an award 
they considered to be “low” or “high” would show less variability in award judgments as 
predicted by the Hans-Reyna model. Our results supported this prediction. The majority of 
participants (n = 96) characterized their awards as “medium,” 2 considered their award “nil,” 30 
considered their award “low,” and 22 considered their award “high” (one participant did not 
respond and the three who gave zero awards were not included in this analysis).   
To test the ordinality prediction, an ANOVA with award amount as the dependent 
variable and subjective ordinal gist of award (as nil, low, medium, or high) as a between-subjects 
factor was conducted. Since sample sizes for our groups were unequal and we expected different 
variances between groups, we confirmed results using the Brown-Forsythe test to ensure results 
were not influenced by violation of the assumption of homogeneity of variance. This analysis 
showed that dollar awards differed across these gist categories (F(3, 146) = 9.05, p = .006, ηp2 = 
.16).  We conducted a subsequent analysis eliminating the nil group (because of small numbers), 
again using award amount as the dependent variable and subjective ordinal gist of award (as low, 
medium, or high) as a between-subjects factor.  This analysis also showed that dollar awards 
differed by the subjective ordinal gist of the award (F(2,145) = 13.30, p < .001, ηp2 =.16), as 
predicted.   
Followup pairwise comparisons using Least Significant Difference corrections showed 
that participants who rated their awards as low gave significantly less than those who considered 
their awards medium (Mlow = $20,524.00, SD = $35,333.02, Mmedium = $203,447.92, SD = 
$342,435.02, F(1, 124) = 8.47, p = .04, d = 0.61, 95% CI [0.19, 1.03]) and those who considered 
their awards high (Mhigh = $606,250.00, SD = $796,677.53, F(1, 50) = 16.29, p < .001, d = 1.13, 
95% CI [0.53, 1.72]); and participants who considered their awards medium gave significantly 
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less than those who considered their awards high (F(1, 116) = 13.77, p < .001, d = 0.88, 95% CI 
[0.40, 1.35]).  The kurtosis of the distribution for those who considered their awards low was 
8.35, the kurtosis of the distribution for those who considered their awards medium was 12.43, 
and the kurtosis of the distribution for those who considered their awards high was 8.26. 
To show the distinctive patterns in the low, medium, and high conditions, Figure 3 
displays the percentage of participants who categorized their awards as low, medium, or high and 
who gave specific dollaw awards (participants who considered their awards nil are not included 
due to the small sample size).  One can observe that awards judged to be low and high are 
distinctive (clustered at the low and high ends of the dollar awards, respectively), but participants 
who judged their awards to be medium had a broader and flatter distribution of values.    
Higher Numeracy is Associated With More Difficulty Reaching a Damage Award Amount 
 We predicted that individual differences in need for cognition, cognitive reflection, and 
numeracy would affect participants’ subjective judgments of the difficulty of making an award 
recommendation, such that greater need for cognition, cognitive reflection, and numeracy would 
reduce perceived difficulty of deciding on a damage award amount.  
 To investigate this prediction, we modified our initial factor analysis by removing the 
participants’ ratings of the difficulty they reported determining a pain and suffering award 
(because that would become the outcome variable).  Then, we used the remaining items in a 
second factor analysis.  Five factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 were extracted, accounting for 
62.44% of the variance.  Table 4 (S1) displays all factor loadings, bolding those above .4.  The 
factors in this factor analysis replicated the five factors from our initial factor analysis, except 
that factor 2 now represented numeracy only, as the difficulty picking a figure item was no 
longer included in the analysis.  Comparison of Table 2 and Table 4 (S1) shows strong overlap in 
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the factors.    
We then entered these factors along with our experimental manipulations (anchor amount 
and anchor meaning) and the interaction between anchor amount and anchor meaning into a 
linear regression predicting difficulty reporting an exact figure (1 = extremely easy; 7 = 
extremely difficult).  In this regression, just one predictor was statistically significant – our 
numeracy factor (B = .29, SE = .10,  β = .25, t(145) = 2.80, p < .05).  However, the direction of 
the numeracy effect was surprising.  The results showed that as participants became more 
numerate, they found it more difficult to pick an exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for her 
pain and suffering. We also ran this regression controlling for the gender of participants. 
Significant and nonsignificant results remained the same and gender was not a significant 
predictor (B = .04, SE = .27, β = .02, t(144) = .16, p = .88). 
Discussion 
Summary of the Results 
Award judgments varied dramatically as a function of whether numerical anchors were 
presented.  When the anchor amounts were large, simply mentioning a relevant or irrelevant 
amount of money—as opposed to encouraging relative comparisons as in prior work—nudged 
awards significantly in the direction of the anchor.  Mock jurors’ exact numerical judgments of 
damage awards were malleable, replicating the impact of anchors found in prior research 
(Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; McAuliff & Bornstein, 2010; Reyna, Hans, et al., 2015).  
Information about magnitude of income (annual or lifetime) was perceived as more 
meaningful to gaining a sense of the size of damage awards than arbitrary values, such as 
courtroom renovations.  Participants generally perceived the gist of their awards as medium 
rather than low or high, and award amounts for the latter two categories clustered in opposite 
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directions, as expected.  Thus, numerical judgments varied but they had some coherence within 
gist categories of low versus high damages.  In contrast, medium awards had a relatively flat 
distribution, covering a wide range of judgments that differed by orders of magnitude.  Serial 
mediation analysis revealed that gist judgments fully mediated the relationship between the 
perceived severity of the plaintiff’s injury and the damage award amount. Each of these results is 
in line with our hypotheses and predictions from the gist model of damage awards (Hans & 
Reyna, 2011; Reyna, Hans, et al., 2015). 
Meaningfulness interacted with the size of the anchor (diverging for meaningful small vs. 
large anchors) once other factors were controlled, such as the perceptions of the plaintiff and 
defendant and individual differences in numeracy and cognitive control.  Validating the 
meaningfulness manipulation, ratings of meaningfulness differed for the meaningful versus 
meaningless anchors—meaningful anchors were rated higher—but meaningfulness ratings 
remained modest on average.  
Together with prior research, there are now two studies demonstrating the distinctive 
effect of meaningful, as opposed to arbitrary, numerical anchors on damage awards.  These 
anchors are meaningful numbers in that they convey a sense of the magnitude of damages in the 
context of the case.  Consistent with this interpretation, effects of anchors accounted for unique 
variance controlling for case factors.  The effect of anchors on award judgments was 
demonstrated here using a more traditional anchoring manipulation.  Results of the current 
experiment are consistent with a theoretical framework that emphasizes qualitative 
representations that govern quantitative judgments, in conjunction with independent effects of 
perceptions of case factors.  Although multiple social, political, and personality characteristics of 
jurors likely contribute to perceptions of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s cases, these seem to be 
FROM MEANING TO MONEY   30 
integrated into two opposing factors that, along with economic damages and desire to punish, 
determined award judgments.  Research varying such characteristics may show additional 
effects. 
We also examined cognitive factors that many theorists have argued should influence 
numerical judgments and decisions, including objective performance measures of quantitative 
competence and subjective perceptions of such competence (e.g., Fagerlin et al., 2007); cognitive 
reflection, which was introduced to capture executive processes involved in inhibiting incorrect 
numerical responses that correlates with general intelligence (e.g., Frederick, 2005); and need for 
cognition, which is the desire to actively engage in cognitive processing as distinct from the 
ability to do so, which has also been associated with superior numerical judgments (e.g., Liberali 
et al., 2012; Stanovich & West, 2008).  Although these measures all loaded on the same 
numeracy/difficulty factor in principal component analyses, this factor did not predict award 
judgments.  The numeracy/difficulty factor also did not interact with anchor meaning in the 
regression. Thus, given the same case facts, more cognitively able individuals were not more 
likely to give smaller, larger, or more variable pain and suffering awards, , suggesting that calls 
for technically proficient jurors—as opposed to ordinary people—will not necessarily decrease 
variability and uncertainty in pain and suffering damage awards. 
Our results also show that quantitative competence predicts perceived difficulty in award 
judgments, but in a surprising way opposite to our hypothesis.  Reviews of the numeracy 
literature suggest that higher numeracy should generally improve numerical judgments, although 
there are important exceptions to this rule (Peters, 2012; Reyna et al., 2009).  In a typical civil 
trial in which jurors might need to calculate losses due to injury or perform other complex 
numerical assessments, numeracy should increase jurors’ competence and confidence in their 
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damage award judgments.  However, our project asked participants to assess money damages 
only for pain and suffering, and we found that numeracy was negatively related to perceived 
difficulty.  More numerate people may have recognized the difficulty of making pain and 
suffering award judgments to a greater extent than less numerate people. 
Limitations of the Present Research 
The ability to test theoretical ideas in a highly controlled setting comes with some clear 
limitations.  Our sample was limited to college students, and although some prior research 
reassures us that college students and other groups often respond comparably to mock trial 
stimuli (Bornstein, 2017; Bornstein, Golding, Neuschatz, Kimbrough, Reed, Magyarics, & 
Luecht, 2017), we believe it is important to test the theoretical predictions with broader samples 
in the future.  Because of the potential impact of numeracy, we think it is especially important to 
study samples with broader ranges of subjective and objective numeracy. Despite the level of 
education of this sample, however, they displayed enormous variability in award judgments.   
Although we were able to manipulate the meaningfulness of the anchor, so that low and 
high meaningful anchors produced significant differences in rated meaning, the “high” 
meaningful anchor was rated as close to the midpoint rather than at the high end of the 
meaningfulness scale. It appears that a more powerful manipulation of meaning is needed that 
better conveys the gist of the magnitude of injury.  Rose and Diamond (2017) report that the civil 
juries whose deliberations they analyzed were more responsive to dollar values that resonated 
with the specific facts of the case and the plaintiff’s injury than to general dollar amounts drawn 
from everyday life.  In addition, relative comparison of magnitudes—not implemented in this 
study—may be an important component to achieve larger effects of meaningfulness of anchors, 
as Reyna, Hans, et al. (2015) found. So both magnitude comparisons and tighter links between 
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suggested dollar values and the case facts might boost the effects of meaningful numbers.  
Then, too, despite the fact that the specific dollar anchor amounts in the current 
experiment were selected based on prior research with a very similar population (Reyna, Hans, et 
al., 2015), the small anchor conditions did not produce awards that differed significantly from the 
no anchor control condition. About half the participants thought the damage award should be 
above and half thought it should be below the small anchor number. That suggests the small 
anchor number was insufficiently distinctive to participants to create anchoring effects through 
contrast or assimilation.  Using the same case facts but a different population of 35 jury-eligible 
community members, McAuliff and Bornstein (2010) obtained an average judgment of $61,992 
in their no anchor pilot study, a number that is not much different from the $50,000 number we 
used for our small anchor conditions, but is substantially different from the Reyna, Hans, et al. 
(2015) average award in the no anchor condition of $224,288.  This difference offers another 
illustration of the variability of what is considered to be an appropriate damage award, and 
underscores the challenge of empirical research on anchoring and awards.  
To allow a clearer test of the hypotheses, we informed respondents that liability had been 
established, that economic losses had already been covered, and that their job was only to decide 
on pain and suffering. Focusing on a single damages element is an approach employed in other 
jury damages research (e.g., McAuliff & Bornstein, 2010; Sunstein et al., 2002). But that 
approach obviously differs from the situation confronting jurors in real trials, who decide on 
liability, compensatory economic and noneconomic damages, and sometimes punitive damages. 
Prior research indicates that there is interactivity among these decisions (Robbennolt & Hans, 
2016), so the singular focus on pain and suffering damages, while it avoids confounding, is a 
limitation of this experiment in terms of ecological validity. Other limitations include the reliance 
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on a relatively short written trial stimulus and the absence of jury deliberation. We hope in future 
research to address these and other limitations by testing theoretical predictions using broader 
samples and more realistic jury decision making paradigms. 
One final limitation stems from our decision to present the case scenario and independent 
variables and ask for participants’ damage awards first, before obtaining responses on scales 
measuring individual differences such as numeracy and cognitive style. Although the latter are 
assumed to be relatively fixed tendencies, we cannot rule out that exposure to the stimulus 
materials affected participants’ responses on the individual difference measures.  However, 
presenting the scales first has the potential to contaminate the experimental manipulations. This 
issue of order of tasks should be addressed in future research by counterbalancing the individual 
difference scales and case scenarios. 
Directions for Future Research 
The results suggest some promising directions for testing Hans and Reyna’s model and 
for exploring practical applications to real-world jury decisionmaking. Pain and suffering, as well 
as other non-economic damages, are inherently subjective and, we would argue, qualitative in 
that they fundamentally involve appreciating the magnitude of injury as low or high.  The exact 
dollars that are attached to this appreciation of the extent of injuries will naturally vary in 
different time periods and jurisdictions, but this contextual flexibility is a strength of using the 
gist of damages to make award judgments.  Consistent with the model, the results of the 
experiment suggest that numerical award judgments will vary and are subject to biases from 
minimal manipulations, such as meaningless and meaningful yardsticks.  However, the model 
implies that appreciating the gist of damages as low or high imposes some ordinal coherence in 
numerical judgments (although perceptions of “medium” damages elicit a wider spread of 
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numbers), and could be the focus of interventions for jurors.   
Jurors high in numeracy are likely to perform well with some types of damage award 
judgments, for example, those requiring mathematical calculations. But mathematics instruction 
or relying on expert jurors may be less helpful when it comes to assessing pain and suffering and 
other intangible damages.  Thus, future research should continue to explore numeracy, but should 
also focus on ways to provide insight into the subjective magnitude of low or high damages to 
imbue numbers with meaning. 
Laypeople’s perceived difficulty in making awards and confidence in their awards are 
also important judgments from a policy perspective and worthy of additional study.  We 
discovered a surprising inverse relationship between numeracy and perceived difficulty; no other 
case or individual factors predicted the perceived difficulty of arriving at a damage award, but 
more research on this neglected topic is needed.  The civil justice system permits judges and 
jurors without special training to decide on money damages.  The just and fair allocation of 
monetary compensation for wrongful injury is central to the operation of the U.S. civil justice 
system. When jurors report that they find it difficult, we should look for ways to help them. The 
current experiment suggests we might explore various approaches to guidance. For example, Ball 
(2011) recommends that attorneys employ a scaling approach, instructing jurors to differentiate 
among low, medium and high injuries and guiding jurors about how to match their sense of the 
severity, length, and consequences of an injury to dollar amounts. Wissler, Saks, Hart, and Evans 
(1997) also propose presenting different forms of information to jurors to help guide their award 
decisions.  
McAuliff and Bornstein (2010) argue compellingly that “Public perceptions of injustice 
are bound to increase if like cases are not treated alike by our legal system” (p. 173).  Their 
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results showed that damage award recommendations that were objectively identical (a seemingly 
paltry $10/hour vs. a seemingly excessive $7,300/month) produced opposite effects.  As in this 
experiment, the dollar amounts in civil damages would seem to be easily manipulated.  However, 
our results go beyond the important findings of malleability and variability by indicating that 
jurors have a strong sense of the magnitude of injury, at least within broad categories of low and 
high damages, and that they are seeking a meaningful metric by which to adjust dollar amounts 
to reflect that sense of injury.  Jurors may indeed treat “like cases… alike” if similarity is defined 
with respect to the underlying gist of the case.  Such a definition would imply that legal practices 
and policies should focus on helping jurors translate the qualitative essence of pain and suffering 
into meaningful numbers, harnassing intuition rather than defeating it.  
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Table 1   
Descriptive Statistics for Judgments and Individual Differences 
 
Scale Mean S.D. Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Severity of injuries  4.71 1.00 2 7 
Severity of pain and 
suffering 
4.90 1.25 2 7 
Perception of P 4.88 1.13 2 7 
Perception of D 3.84 1.02 1 7 
Extent D negligent 7.12 1.94 1 11 
Extent D caused P’s 
injuries 
8.57 2.15 2 11 
Difficulty picking figure 5.45 1.17 2 7 
Motivation to determine 
award 
4.67 1.39 1 7 
Cognitive effort to 
determine award 
4.62 1.24 1 7 
Role of punishment  2.61 1.47 1 7 
Role of economic losses  3.40 1.92 1 7 
Objective Numeracy (α 
= .55) 
12.33 2.06 4 15 
Subjective Numeracy (α 
= .81) 
30.27 6.06 13 43 
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CRT (α = .59) 1.92 1.07 0 3 
Need for Cognition  (α 
= .90) 
14.10 18.68 -35 57 
 
Note. P = Plaintiff; D = Defendant. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test. Higher numbers reflect 
greater severity of injuries and pain and suffering, more positive perceptions of plaintiff and 
defendant, greater defendant negligence and causation of plaintiff injuries, more difficulty 
picking figure, more motivation and cognitive effort to determine award, greater role of 
punishment and economic losses in determining award, and higher scores on scales of Objective 
Numeracy, Subjective Numeracy, CRT, and Need for Cognition. 
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Table 2 
Factor Solution for Individual Differences and Case Questions 
Measures Numeracy
/Difficulty 
Motivation/
Effort   
Perception 
of P 
Perception
of D 
Punishment/ 
Economic 
Loss 
Severity of injuries -.09 .01 .80 .03 .11 
Severity of pain and 
suffering 
-.11 .01 .80 .03 -.08 
Perception of P .09 .26 .65 .11 -.08 
Perception of D .07 .23 .02 -.84 .03 
Extent D negligent .07 .30 .14 .79 -.12 
Extent D caused P’s 
injuries 
.31 .33 .27 .42 .02 
Difficulty picking 
figure 
.52 -.29 .08 .03 -.22 
Motivation to 
determine award 
.04 .88 .13 .18 -.08 
Cognitive effort to 
determine award 
.07 .86 .07 -.10 -.11 
Role of punishment -.16 .01 -.07 -.04 .82 
Role of economic 
losses  
.04 -.17 .03 -.07 .77 
Objective Numeracy .75 .15 -.02 .01 .05 
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Subjective Numeracy .66 .03 .09 -.05 .01 
CRT .60 .03 -.11 .25 -.20 
Need for Cognition .52 .08 -.25 -.05 .02 
Eigenvalue 
-- (% variance) 
2.82 
(18.83) 
2.13 
(14.12) 
1.50 
(10.03) 
1.34 
(8.93) 
1.20 
(8.00) 
 
Note. P = Plaintiff; D = Defendant. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test. Higher numbers reflect 
greater severity of injuries and pain and suffering, more positive perceptions of plaintiff and 
defendant, greater defendant negligence and causation of plaintiff injuries, more difficulty 
picking figure, more motivation and cognitive effort to determine award, greater role of 
punishment and economic losses in determining award, and higher scores on scales of Objective 
Numeracy, Subjective Numeracy, CRT, and Need for Cognition. 
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Table 3 
Multiple Regression Predicting Award Amount   
Variables B SE β t 
Anchor meaning  -134,036.95 117,043.82 -.13 -1.15   
Anchor amount  163,498.95 114,449.81 .16 1.43 
Meaning x amount 334,934.40 161,418.08 .29 2.08* 
Motivation / effort 57,389.05 40,784.56 .11 1.41  
Numeracy / difficulty -74,052.46 412,111.56 -.14 -1.80 
Perception of plaintiff 91,878.80 43,700.12 .17 2.10* 
Perception of defendant 130,320.87 410,000.38 .25 3.18* 
Punishment / economic loss  132,307.16 40,844.57 .26 3.24* 
 
Note. Anchor meaning: 0 = meaningless; 1= meaningful); anchor amount: 0 = low; 1 = high. 
Higher numbers indicate greater motivation, greater numeracy and difficulty picking award, more 
positive perception of the plaintiff and greater perceived severity of pain and suffering, more 
negative perception and greater perceived negligence of the defendant, and more role for 
punishment and economic loss in determining award. Regression model summary: R = .57, R2 = 
.33, Adjusted R2 = .28, SE = 430,921.65. *p < .05.  
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Table 4 (S1) 
Factor Solution for Individual Differences and Case Questions without Difficulty Item 
Measures Motivation 
/ Effort 
Numeracy   Perception 
of P 
Perception 
of D 
Punishment / 
Economic Loss 
Severity of injuries .01 -.07 .81 .03 .09 
Severity of pain and 
suffering 
.00 -.09 .82 .03 -.10 
Perception of P .32 .04 .61 .11 -.05 
Perception of D .23 .07 .01 -.84 .04 
Extent D negligent .31 .07 .13 .79 -.13 
Extent D caused P’s 
injuries 
.40 .25 .22 .44 .06 
Motivation to 
determine award 
.88 .04 .11 .16 -.08 
Cognitive effort to 
determine award 
.87 .05 .04 -.12 -.10 
Role of punishment -.01 -.14 -.06 -.04 .81 
Role of economic 
losses  
-.14 .02 .02 -.06 .79 
Objective Numeracy .14 .77 -.01 .02 .04 
Subjective 
Numeracy 
-.03 .72 .14 -.06 -.05 
CRT .00 .63 -.09 .25 -.23 
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Need for Cognition .06 .54 -.24 -.04 .01 
Eigenvalue 2.81 2.03 1.47 1.31 1.18 
-- (% variance) 20.10 14.50 10.49 9.34 8.43 
 
Note.  P = Plaintiff; D = Defendant. CRT = Cogntive Reflection Test. Higher numbers indicated 
greater severity of injuries and pain and suffering, more positive perceptions of plaintiff and 
defendant, greater defendant negligence and causation of plaintiff injuries, more motivation and 
cognitive effort to determine award, greater role of punishment and economic losses, and higher 
scores on scales of Objective Numeracy, Subjective Numeracy, CRT, and Need for Cognition. 
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Table 5 (S2) 
Factor Solution with Oblique (Promax) Rotation for Individual Differences and Case Questions 
Measures Numeracy / 
Difficulty 
Motivation/
Effort   
Perception 
of P 
Perception
of D 
Punishment/ 
Economic 
Loss 
Severity of injuries -.09 .09 .79 .10 .10 
Severity of pain and 
suffering 
-.10 .10 .80 .12 -.09 
Perception of P .13 .35 .67 .21 -.11 
Perception of D .02 .16 -.04 -.80 .08 
Extent D negligent .17 .40 .24 .84 -.19 
Extent D caused P’s 
injuries 
.38 .42 .33 .50 -.05 
Difficulty picking figure .51 -.21 .05 .07 -.26 
Motivation to determine 
award 
.13 .91 .23 .28 -.11 
Cognitive effort to 
determine award 
.15 .86 .15 .01 -.13 
Role of punishment -.23 -.06 -.09 -.13 .83 
Role of economic losses  -.05 -.21 -.01 -.15 .77 
Objective Numeracy .76 .21 -.02 .08 -.03 
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Subjective Numeracy .65 .09 .07 .01 -.06 
CRT .64 .10 -.09 .30 -.28 
Need for Cognition .51 .09 -.25 -.03 -.02 
Eigenvalue 2.83 2.13 1.50 1.34 1.20 
-- (% variance) 18.86 14.17 10.03 8.93 8.00 
 
Note. P = Plaintiff; D = Defendant. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test. Higher numbers reflect 
greater severity of injuries and pain and suffering, more positive perceptions of plaintiff and 
defendant, greater defendant negligence and causation of plaintiff injuries, more difficulty 
picking figure, more motivation and cognitive effort to determine award, greater role of 
punishment and economic losses in determining award, and higher scores on scales of Objective 
Numeracy, Subjective Numeracy, CRT, and Need for Cognition. 
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Figure 1. Significant two-way interaction between anchor condition (no anchor, meaningless small anchor, meaningless large anchor, 
meaningful small anchor, and meaningful large anchor) and award type (lowest acceptable award, regular award, highest acceptable 
award). Error bars represent + / - 1 standard error. 
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Figure 2.  Significant interaction between anchor meaning and anchor amount (controlling for 
factors representing numeracy / difficulty, motivation / cognitive effort, perception of the 
plaintiff, perception of the defendant, and extent punishment and economic loss were taken into 
account). Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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Figure 3.  Distribution of awards for participants who considered their award to be low, medium, 
and high. 
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